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Distributed Downlink Power Control for
Dense Networks with Carrier Aggregation
Zana Limani Fazliu, Student Member, IEEE, Carla-Fabiana Chiasserini, Senior
Member, IEEE, Gian Michele Dell’Aera, Enver Hamiti
Abstract
Given the proven benefits cell densification brings in terms of capacity and coverage, it is certain
that 5G networks will be even more heterogeneous and dense. However, as smaller cells are introduced
in the network, interference will inevitably become a serious problem as they are expected to share
the same radio resources. Another central feature envisioned for future cellular networks is carrier
aggregation (CA), which allows users to simultaneously use several component carriers of various
widths and frequency bands. By exploiting the diversity of the different carriers, CA can also be used
to effectively mitigate the interference in the network. In this paper, we leverage the above key features
of next-generation cellular networks and formulate a downlink power setting problem for the different
available carriers. Using game theory, we design a distributed algorithm that lets cells dynamically adjust
different transmit powers for the different carriers. The proposed solution greatly improves network
performance by reducing interference and power consumption, while ensuring coverage for as many
users as possible. We compare our scheme to other interference mitigation techniques, in a realistic large-
scale scenario. Numerical results show that our solution outperforms the existing schemes in terms of
user throughput, energy and spectral efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Densification of wireless cellular networks, by overlaying smaller cells over the traditional
macrocell, is seen as an inevitable step in enabling future networks to support the expected
increase in data rate demand. As we move towards 5G, networks will become more heterogeneous
as services will be offered via various types of points of access (PoAs). Indeed, besides the
traditional macro base station, it is expected that users will be able to access the network through
WiFi access points, small cell (i.e., micro, pico and femto) base stations, or even other users when
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device-to-device communications are supported. This approach will improve both the capacity
and the coverage of current cellular networks, however, since the different PoAs are expected
to fully share the available radio resources, inter-cell interference as well as the interference
between the different tiers will pose a significant challenge [1].
Future networks are also expected to support carrier aggregation (CA), which allows the
simultaneous use of several component carriers (CCs), in order to guarantee higher data rates
for end users. Downlink transmissions over the CCs will be characterized by different values of
maximum output power depending on the type of PoA, and each carrier will have an independent
power budget [2]. Thus, since CCs may belong to different frequency bands, they may have also
very different coverage areas and impact in terms of interference, due to both their different
transmit power level and their propagation characteristics.
Currently, three main approaches have been proposed to address the interference problem in
dense networks: per-tier assignment of carriers, Enhanced Inter Cell Interference Coordination
(eICIC), which has been adopted in LTE-A systems, and downlink power control. Per-tier
assignment of carriers simply implies that in CA-enabled networks, each tier is assigned a
different CC so as to nullify inter-tier interference [3]. eICIC includes techniques such as Cell
Range Expansion (CRE) to incentivize users to associate with micro base stations, and Almost
Blank Subframes (ABS), i.e., subframes during which macrocells mute their transmissions to
alleviate the interference caused to microcells. Algorithms to optimize biasing coefficients and
ABS patterns in LTE heterogeneous networks have been studied in, e.g., [4], however they do
not address CA. Also, modifications to the eICIC techniques that allow macro base stations to
transmit at reduced power during ABS subframes have been proposed in [3]. In this paper we
do not consider a solution within the framework of eICIC or its modifications, rather we use
them as comparison benchmarks for the solutions we propose.
We adopt instead the third approach, which consists in properly setting the downlink transmit
power of the different CA-enabled PoAs so as to avoid interference between different tiers. We
propose to leverage the diversity in the component carrier coverage areas to mitigate inter-tier
interference by varying their downlink transmit power. Thus, we enable a wide range of network
configurations which reduce power consumption, provide high throughput and ensure a high level
of coverage to network users. This type of configurations have also been envisioned by 3GPP
[5], however, unlike the current specifications, we aim at reaching such solutions dynamically
and in-response to real traffic demand.
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As envisioned in LTE-A systems and unlike most of previous work, we consider that each CC
at each PoA has an independent power budget, and that PoAs can choose the transmit power
on each carrier from a discrete set of values. Therefore, our goal is to adequately choose a
power level from a range of choices to ensure optimal network performance. It is easy to see
that the complexity of the problem increases exponentially with the number of cells, CCs and
the granularity of the power levels available to the PoAs. In addition, if one of the objectives is
to maximize the network throughput, the problem becomes non linear since transmission data
rates depend on the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) experienced by the users. It
follows that an optimal solution requiring a centralized approach would be both unfeasible and
unrealistic, given the large number of cells in the network.
We therefore study the above problem through the lens of game theory, which is an excellent
mathematical tool to obtain a multi-objective, distributed solution in a scenario with entities
(PoAs) sharing the same pool of resources (available CCs). We model each group of PoAs in
the coverage area of a macrocell as a team so that we can capture both (i) cooperation between
the macrocell and the small cells with overlapping coverage areas, and (ii) the competitive
interests of different macrocells. The framework we provide however allows for straightforward
extension to teams that include several macrocells. We prove that the game we model belongs to
the class of pseudo-potential games, which are known to admit pure Nash Equilibria (NE) [6].
This allows us to propose a distributed algorithm based on best-reply dynamics that enables the
network to dynamically reach an NE representing the preferred solution in terms of throughput,
user coverage and power consumption. As shown by simulation results, our scheme outperforms
fixed transmit power strategies, even when advanced interference mitigation techniques such as
eICIC are employed.
II. RELATED WORK
While many papers have appeared in the literature on uplink power control, fewer exist
on downlink power setting. Among these, [7] uses coalitional games to investigate power and
resource allocation in heterogeneous networks where cooperation between players is allowed.
Downlink power allocation in cellular networks is modeled in [8] as a Stackelberg game,
with macro and femto base stations competing to maximize their individual capacities under
power constraints. Resource allocation in heterogeneous networks is also addressed in [9] where
the authors propose two possible solutions, a heuristic approach using simulated annealing
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and geometric optimization, while taking into account both the geometry of the network and
load fluctuations. Interference in densely deployed femtocell networks is addressed in [10]
through proper power adjustment and user scheduling. The authors propose a heuristic distributed
algorithm that adjusts the coverage radius of the femtocells and then schedules the users in a
fair manner. However, the algorithm applies only to femtocells, thereby missing out on many
possible solutions offering both better energy efficiency and network throughput. A backhaul-
aware approach is taken by the authors in [11] where they propose an optimal user association
scheme to mitigate interference, which takes into account the base station load, the backhaul
load as well as backhaul topology.
An energy efficient approach is instead proposed in [12]. There, base stations do not select
transmit power levels as we do in our work, rather they can only choose between on and off
states. Maximizing energy efficiency is also the goal of [13], which however is limited to the
study of resource allocation and downlink transmit power in a two-tier LTE single cell. In [14],
in order to improve the energy efficiency of ultra-dense networks, the authors frame the problem
of joint power control and user scheduling as a mean-field game and solve it using the drift
plus penalty (DPP) approach in the framework of Lyapunov optimization. Mean-field games are
also used in [15] where the interference problem (both inter-tier and inter-cell interference) is
formulated as a two-nested problem: an overlay problem at the macrocell level and an underlay
problem at the small-cel level. In the overlay problem, the macrocell selects the optimal action
first, to provide minimum service, while the underlay problem is then formulated as a non-
cooperative game among the small cells. The mean-field theory is exploited to help decouple a
complex large-scale optimization problem into a family of localized optimization problems.
We remark that the above papers address heterogeneous dense networks but, unlike our work,
they do not consider CA support, which will be a fundamental feature of future cellular networks
and significantly changes the problem settings. Also, [7], [8], [13] formulate a resource allocation
problem that aims at distributing the transmit power among the available resources under overall
power constraints. In our work, instead, we do not formulate the problem as a downlink power
allocation problem, rather as a power setting problem at carrier level, assuming each carrier has
an independent power budget. Additionally, while most of the previous work [9], [10], [12], [13],
[16] focus on the heterogeneous network interference problem only, using game theory concepts
we jointly address interference mitigation, power consumption and user coverage by taking
advantage of the diversity and flexibility provided by the availability of multiple component
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carriers. Finally, we propose a solution that enables the PoAs to dynamically change their power
strategies based on user distribution, propagation conditions and traffic patterns.
To our knowledge, the only existing work that investigates downlink power setting in cellular
networks with CA support is [17]. There, Yu et al. formulate an optimization problem that aims
at maximizing the system energy efficiency by optimizing power allocation and user association.
However, interference issues, which are one of the main challenges we address, are largely
ignored in [17] as the authors consider a non-heterogeneous, single cell scenario.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
We consider a CA-enabled two-tier dense network composed of macro and microcells, each
controlled by different types of PoAs. The network serves a large number of CA-enabled user
equipments (UEs), which may move at low-speed (pedestrian) or high-speed (vehicles).
To make the problem tractable, we partition the entire network area into a set of identically-
sized square-shaped tiles, or zones, denoted by Z . From the perspective of downlink power
setting, the propagation conditions within a tile from a specific PoA represent averages of the
conditions experienced by the UEs within the tile. Note that the tile size can be arbitrarily set,
and represents a trade-off between complexity and realism. The choice, however, must be such
that, the number of users falling within a tile should not be too high, and the assumption that
they experience similar channel conditions should hold. We will assume that tiles (i.e., the UEs
therein) are associated with the strongest received reference power, although the extension to
other, dynamic association schemes as well as to the case where a tile is served by multiple
PoAs can be easily obtained. For simplicity, the user equipments (UEs) in the network area
are all assumed to be CA enabled. Note, however, that the extension to a higher number of
tiers as well as to the case where there is a mix of CA-enabled and non CA-enabled UEs is
straightforward. All cells share the same radio resources. In particular, a comprehensive set of
component carriers (CC), indicated by C, is available simultaneously at all PoAs (PoAs having
at their disposal a subset of CCs is a sub-case of this scenario). Each CC is defined by a central
frequency and a certain bandwidth. The central frequency affects the carrier’s coverage area, as
the propagation conditions deteriorate greatly with increasing frequency.
The level of transmit power irradiated by each PoA on the available CCs can be updated
periodically depending on the traffic and propagation conditions in the served tiles, or it can be
triggered by changes in UE distribution or traffic demand. The update time interval, however,
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Fig. 1. Network model and teams. Team locations are denoted by l1, l2, l3. Solid red lines represent team boundaries, while
black solid lines represent coverage areas. Tiles are represented by grey squares.
the type of PoA. As noted before, each CC at each PoA has an independent power budget.
In order to determine the downlink power setting, PoAs can leverage the feedback they receive
from their users on the channel quality that UEs experience. Also, we assume that PoAs within
the same macrocell are interconnected, or at least connected to the macro PoA, via, e.g., optical
fiber connections, which allows for swift communication between them. As a result, we assume
that it is possible for the macro PoA and the corresponding micro PoAs to cooperate and
exchange information in order to reach common decisions. This is a reasonable assumption
since it is expected that the architecture foreseen for future networks will allow PoAs that are
geographically close to share a common baseband [19]. Furthermore, it is fair to assume that
neighbouring macro PoAs can communicate with each other.
IV. GAME THEORY APPROACH
As mentioned, the complexity of carrier power setting may be very high and impair an optimal,
centralised solution in networks with many cells. We therefore adopt a game theoretic approach to
the problem, which provides a low-complexity, distributed solution that is applicable in realistic
scenarios.
We formulate the problem of power setting in HetNets with carrier aggregation as a competitive
game between teams of PoAs (see Fig. 1), where each team wants to maximize its own payoff.
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Fig. 1. Network model and teams. Team locations are denoted by l1, l2, l3. Solid red lines represent team boundaries, while
black solid lines represent coverage areas. Tiles are represented by grey squares.
is expected to be substantially longer than a r ource block (RB)1 llocation period, e.g., order
of hundreds of subframes. Indeed, since downlink power setting is based on averaged values
of reported CSI’s over the tile, it is not imperative for a power setting scheme to constantly
have accurate CSI for each u r; dditionally, it is not necessary for the update period to be
aligned with the coherence time of the channel. The PoAs can choose from a discrete set of
available power levels, including 0 that corresponds to switching off the CC. The possible power
values are expressed as fractions of the maximum transmit power, which may vary depending
on the type of PoA, i.e., P = {0.1, 0.2, ..., 1}. As noted before, each CC at each PoA has an
independent power budget.
IV. GAME THEORY FRAMEWORK
As mentioned before, game theory is an excellent tool to address complex problems, for which
an optimal centralized solution might not be feasible. In game theory, solutions to complex
problems are usually reached by identifying the Nash Equilibria (NE) of the game; these are
strategy profiles in which every player plays its best strategy, considering all other players’
strategies fixed. Since none of the players have an incentive to unilaterally move from an NE
strategy, such outcomes of the game are desirable, indeed they represent stable solutions which
can be reached in a distributed manner. Considering that the complexity of the carrier power
setting problem increases exponentially with the number of PoAs, CCs and the granularity of the
transmit power levels, we adopt a game theoretic approach in order to derive low-complexity,
distributed solutions that lead to NEs and are applicable in practice.
1A resource block (RB) is the smallest resource unit that can be allocated to a UE in LTE. It is 180 kHz wide and 1 ms long.
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Specifically, we formulate the problem of power setting in dense CA-enabled networks as a
competitive game between teams of PoAs (see Fig. 1), where each team wants to maximize
its own payoff. Indeed, given the network architecture at hand, PoAs within an overlapping
geographical area have the common objective to provide the UEs under their coverage high
data throughput. Thus, they may choose to cooperate with each other in order to improve their
individual payoffs as well as contribute to the “social welfare” of the team. Cooperation among
such PoAs is beneficial especially since the inter-tier interference is most significant within the
cell. It follows that teams will compete between each other for the same resources, each aiming
at maximizing their own benefits. The game we model and its analysis are detailed below. We
note that the formulation can be easily extended to accommodate various team configurations
and clusters of teams, each controlled by a central controller.
A. Game model
Let G = {T ,S,W} be a competitive game between the set of players T , where S is the
comprehensive set of strategies available to the players and W is the set of payoff functions.
The objective of each player in the game is to choose a strategy such that it maximizes its
payoff. The payoff function, in general, depends also on the strategies of the other players, thus
a player must make decisions accounting for the strategies the other players have selected. We
now proceed to define the players, strategies and payoff functions in our scenario.
1) Players: As we mentioned in the previous section, we formulate the carrier transmit power
setting as a competitive game between teams of PoAs. Hence the players in our competitive game
are the teams, each comprising a macro PoA and the micro PoAs whose coverage areas geograph-
ically overlap with that of the macrocell. The terms team and player are used interchangeably
throughout the paper. We denote the set of teams in our network as T = {t1, ..., tT}, where T
is the number of teams. We assume that the team members exchange information between each
other, and that the macro PoA plays the role of team leader, i.e., it makes the decisions for all
team members in a way that maximizes the overall team benefits. Furthermore, we will refer to
the PoAs forming a team t as the locations of the team, Lt = {l1, l2, ..., lL} where, for simplicity
of notation, the number of locations within a team is assumed to be constant and equal to L.
Such a generalization is particularly useful since the interference caused within the team depends
also on the relative position between the different PoAs. We indicate the set of tiles under the
coverage area of a particular location l by Zl, and their union, denoting the comprehensive set of
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tiles of the team, by Zt. In addition, we use El, Ez and Et to denote the number of UEs under
the coverage of location l, tile z, and team t, respectively, with Et =
∑
l∈Lt El =
∑
z∈Zt Ez.
2) Strategies: Each team, comprising a set of locations, has to decide which transmit power
level to use (out of the possible values in P ), at each one of those locations and for each of the
available carriers C = {c1, c2, ..., cC}. It follows that the strategy selected by a team t, st, is an
L× C matrix, where each (l, c) entry indicates the power level chosen from set P , to be used
at location l on carrier c. Consequently, the strategy set available to a team will be composed
of all possible combinations of power levels, locations and carriers.
3) Payoff functions: In game theory payoff functions are used to model the objectives of the
players, usually expressed in terms of utility and cost, when choosing between different available
strategies. Since network throughput is an important performance metric in cellular networks, it
is natural that the utility of each team in our scenario is defined as a function of the data rates
it can serve to its UEs. The data rate a UE obtains is closely linked to the SINR it experiences,
which depends on the transmit power chosen by the serving location (PoA), the CC that is used
and the transmit power levels chosen by neighboring locations. Assuming that all UEs within
the same tile experience the same amount of interference, for each team we can first define
an interference matrix of size |Zt| × C, denoted by It. Each entry in the matrix indicates the
interference experienced by UEs in tile z on carrier c, which is caused by other teams:
I tz,c(s
−t) =
∑
t′∈T ∧t′ 6=t
∑
l′∈Lt′
st
′
l′,cal′,z,c (1)
where s−t represents the strategies adopted by all teams other than t, st′l′,c is the power level (the
strategy) of team t′ for location l′ on carrier c, and al′,z,c is the attenuation factor (0 ≤ al′,z,c ≤ 1)
related to the signal transmitted from location l′ on c and received by the UEs in tile z. The
attenuation values are pre-calculated using the urban propagation models specified in [18]. The
SINR at tile z, when served by location l in team t, is:
γtz,c =
stl,cal,z,c
N +
∑
l′∈Lt∧l′ 6=l al′,z,cs
t
l′,c + I
t
z,c
(2)
where N represents the average noise power level. Note that, besides N and I tz,c, we have an
additional term at the denominator, which stands for the intra-team interference and indicates
the sum of all power received from the locations within the same team, other than location l.
Then the utility of each team can be defined as a function of the individual tiles’ SINR
values. In particular, the sigmoid-like function has been often used for this purpose in uplink
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power control [19]. We note that this function is suited to capture also the utility in downlink
power setting, as it has features that closely resemble the realistic relationship between the SINR
and the data rate. We therefore adopt the sigmoid function proposed in [19], as the utility function
of each (tile, carrier) duplet in the team, and write the team utility as:
ut(st, s−t) =
∑
l∈Lt
∑
z∈Zl
∑
c∈C
Ez
Et
(
1 + e−α(γtz,c−β)
) . (3)
The sigmoid function in Eq. (3) has two tuneable parameters, α, which controls the steepness
of the function, and β, which controls its centre. They can be tweaked to best meet the scenario
of interest. In particular, the higher the α, the closer the function resembles a step function, i.e.,
the utility becomes more discontinuous with the increase of the SINR. The higher the β, the
larger the SINR for which a tile obtains a positive utility. In our scenario, α and β are set so
that the resulting sigmoid-like function captures the relationship between SINR and throughput.
In addition, the individual utility of each tile z in team t is weighted by the fraction of UEs
covered by the team in the tile (Ez/Et) so as to give more weight to more populated tiles. This
enables us to account for the user spatial distribution whenever this is not uniform over the
network area.
Next, we introduce a cost function to account for the interference and its detrimental effect,
as well as for fairness in the service level to users. We define a first cost component that aims at
penalizing teams who choose high power strategies, as:
∑
l∈Lt
∑
c∈C ξ
t
l,ca¯l,cs
t
l,c where a¯l,c is the
link quality (i.e., attenuation) on carrier c averaged over all tiles served by location l, and ξtl,c is
the price per received power unit for location l and carrier c. This cost component increases with
the increase in the chosen level of transmit power, however it also accounts for the propagation
conditions of the users served by the location. In other words, locations that have to serve UEs
experiencing poor channel quality will incur a lower cost, which ensures some level of fairness.
The way the unit price, ξ, should be set is investigated in Sec. IV-B.
The second term of the cost function further provides fairness in the network by penalizing
those strategies that leave UEs without coverage. It is defined as δet, where δ is a unit price
paid for each unserved user and et is the fraction of UEs within the team area that experience
SINR levels below a certain threshold. We remark that since a macro PoA can communicate
with the micro PoAs in the macrocell, the team leader has knowledge of the UE density under
the coverage of its locations. Thus, it can easily estimate the fraction of users, et, depending on
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the strategy chosen for each of its locations (st) as well as on all other teams’ strategies (s−t).
The total cost function is then given by:
pit(st, s−t) =
∑
l∈Lt
∑
c∈C
ξtl,ca¯l,cs
t
l,c + δet (4)
where ξ and δ indicate the weight that is assigned to each part of the cost function. Finally, we
define the payoff of each team t as the utility minus the cost paid:
wt(st, s−t) = ut(st, s−t)− pit(st, s−t) . (5)
As mentioned, a team’s goal is to maximize its payoff. Provided that the team is aware of the
strategies selected by other teams, it can choose among its available strategies, the one that
maximizes the payoff function. We will refer to this strategy as best reply.
Moreover, to reduce both power consumption and the interference towards other teams, a team
will select its best reply among strategies that maximize its payoff, as follows.
(i) Between strategies that are equivalent in terms of payoff, it will choose the one with the
lowest total power, to reduce the overall power consumption.
(ii) When indifferent between strategies with equal total power but assigned to different locations,
it will select the strategy that assigns higher power levels to micro PoAs that are closer to the
centre of the cell, to minimize interference.
(iii) When indifferent with respect to the two above criteria, it will choose the strategy that
assigns higher power levels to higher frequency carriers, again, to minimize interference.
B. Price setting
The price parameter ξtl,c introduced in Eq. (4) is an important parameter which affects the nature
of the game. To gain some insight into the possible values of ξ, we can start by considering a
single carrier, single location scenario. We further simplify the scenario to consider one tile per
location; dropping the superfluous notation, the team payoff becomes:
wt =
1(
1 + e
−α( astIt+N−β)
) − ξtast (6)
where It(s−t) indicates the interference determined by other teams’ strategies. We also set δ = 0,
since the two cost components are independent of each other, therefore the second component
bears no effect on the analysis of the first component. Differentiating with respect to the team’s
chosen strategy, st, which now is scalar, and solving for 0, we get:
e
−2α( astIt+N−β) −
(
α
ξt(It +N) − 2
)
e
−α( astIt+N−β) + 1 = 0 . (7)
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From the above expression, we can derive the strategy tha maximizes the payoff, which turns
out to be a real and positive value only if the following condition is satisfied:
ξt ≤ α
4 (It +N) . (8)
The last expression indicates that the price parameter ξt is inversely proportional to the inter-
ference experienced by the UEs served by the team location. If the interference experienced by
the UEs in the tiles served by the location increases, it is clear that the value of ξt needs to
be lowered in order to ensure that the chosen power is a positive value. This suggests that, in
order to achieve high performing operational points for our network, a dynamic price setting
is required, so that the teams can adapt to the changing interference, as other teams change
their strategies. Also, note that the interference experienced by users in a tile does not affect the
interference experienced by users in other tiles; the same holds for the interference experienced
by users in the same tile, but using different carriers. This implies that the relationship between
the price parameter and interference remains the same, even when more carriers and more tiles
are considered.
We further remark that aside from being dynamically updated depending on the value of
the interference, the price must also be tailored individually for each team location. Indeed,
the interference experienced by UEs served by a specific location l depends not only on the
strategies selected by other teams, but also on the topology of the network, i.e., the relative
position and distance between the interfering locations and said UEs. A team leader can leverage
the knowledge it has about its team topology to adjust the price parameter, according to each
location’s expected external interference coming from other teams, and the expected intra-team
interference.
Algorithm 1 Dynamic team price setting
Require: c, sc, t
1: for all l ∈ Lt do
2: I¯ tl,c = 0
3: for all z ∈ Zl do
4: Compute I tz,c by using Eq. (1)
5: I intz,c =
∑
l′∈Lt∧l′ 6=l s
t
l′,cal′,z,c
6: I¯ tl,c = I¯
t
l,c +
Ez
El
(
I tz,c + I
int
z,c
)
7: ξtl,c =
kα
I¯tl,c
How to dynamically update the price for each team location under general settings is shown
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in Alg. 1. The procedure takes into account both the external interference coming from the other
competing teams, calculated in line 4, as well as the internal interference coming from the other
locations of the team, calculated in line 5. Once these values are obtained, the price parameter ξtl,c
is updated in line 7 using ξtl,c =
kα
I¯tl,c
, where k is a weight factor used to indicate the importance
we place on the cost function; higher k values indicate that consuming less power will be given
more consideration when selecting the best response. As a result, for higher k we obtain overall
lower best response values, and vice versa. Note that k ≤ 1/4 must hold in order to satisfy
Eq. (8). Note that the initial price for each team location is determined given an initial strategy,
sc, which can be any of the fixed strategies, and then updated every iteration or game. Although
more frequent updates can be implemented, our results show that it is sufficient to update the
price parameters once for each game run.
C. Game analysis
To analyse the behaviour of the above-defined game, and discuss the existence of NEs, we
rely on the definition of games of strategic complements/substitutes with aggregation as provided
in [6], [20].
A game Γ = {P ,S,W}, where P is the set of players, and S and W are defined as above,
is a game of strategic substitutes with aggregation if for each player p ∈ P there exists a
best-reply function θp : S−p → Sp such that:
1) θp(I
p) ∈ Θ(Ip) (9)
2) θp is continuous in S−p (10)
3) θp(Iˆ
p) ≤ θp(Ip), ∀Iˆp > Ip . (11)
Θ(Ip) is the set of best replies for player p and S−p is the Cartesian product of the strategy sets
of all participating players other than p. Ip is an additive function of all other players’ strategies,
also referred to as the aggregator [20]:
Ip(s−p) =
∑
p′∈P,p′ 6=p
bp′sp′ (12)
where bp′ are scalar values. Condition 1) is fulfilled whenever the dependence of the payoff
function on the other players’ strategies can be completely encompassed by the aggregator.
Condition 2), also known as the continuity condition, implies that for each possible value of Ip,
the best reply function θp provides unique best replies. Condition 3) implies that the best reply
of the team decreases with the value of the aggregator.
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A game of strategic complements with aggregation is identical, except for condition 3),
which changes into:
θp(Iˆ
p) ≤ θp(Ip), ∀Iˆp < Ip , (13)
i.e., in the case of games of strategic complements, the best reply of the team increases with the
value of the aggregator.
Next, we show the following important result.
Theorem 1: Our competitive team-based gameG is a game of strategic complements/substitutes
with aggregation.
Proof: See Appendix A.
As a further remark to the above result, it is worth stressing that the cost introduced in
Eq. (4) is an important function that determines whether the game is of strategic complements
or substitutes. Indeed, if we consider the payoff to coincide with the utility function (i.e., ξ =
δ = 0), a team’s best reply will consist in increasing its transmit power as the interference
grows, implying that the game is of strategic complements. This would lead to an NE in which
all teams transmit at maximum power level, without consideration for the interference caused.
Instead, imposing some ξ > 0, the game will turn into a game of strategic substitutes. This is
because the first term of the cost function is linear with the received power, and hence increasing
with the chosen strategies. Therefore, the payoff function will start decreasing once the increase
in the chosen transmit powers does not justify the price the team has to pay. Note that, throughout
the paper, we will consider ξ > 0 , therefore our game is of strategic substitutes. Imposing some
δ > 0 (i.e., activating the second cost component), the relationship between transmit power and
cost becomes more complicated but it does not change the nature of the game: the fraction of
unserved UEs within the team will be high for very low power strategies, then it will decrease
as the transmit power is increased, and increase again as the strategies chosen cause high intra-
team interference. In other words, the second cost component strengthens the trend in the payoff
function imposed by the utility for increasing interference in presence of low power strategies.
For those mid-level strategies that ensure good coverage, it does not affect the cost function.
Instead, it resembles the behavior of the first cost component for high power strategies, as it is
still able to discriminate against high power strategies that may harm the system performance.
Main results from [6], [20] and references therein show that games of strategic comple-
ments/substitutes with aggregation belong to the class of pseudo-potential games, which are
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known to admit pure Nash Equilibria. Another important result that holds for such games with
a discrete set of strategies is that, thanks to the continuity condition in Eq. (10), convergence to
an NE is ensured by best reply dynamics [6], [20].
V. THE POWER SETTING ALGORITHM
We now use the above model and results to build a distributed, low-complexity scheme that
enables efficient downlink power setting on each CC. We first consider a single carrier and
show that it converges to the best NE among the possible ones, in terms of payoff. We aim
for an NE because it is the only solution of the game which the participating teams can reach
independently, although it may not be the most optimal one in terms of utility. We then extend
the algorithm to the multiple-carrier case and discuss its complexity.
A. Single-carrier scenario
Let us first focus on a single carrier and consider two possible borderline strategies that a
team may adopt: the max-power strategy in which all locations transmit at the highest power
level, and the min-power strategy in which all locations transmit at the lowest available power
level greater than 0. As shown in our previous study [21], it transpires that the min-power always
outperforms the max-power in a multi-tier dense scenario. We therefore devise a procedure that
should be executed by each team leader (macro PoA), in order to update the locations’ downlink
power setting, either periodically or upon changes in the user traffic or propagation conditions.
It is based on the intuition that if teams are to start from the lowest possible strategy (i.e., zero
transmit power), then the overall transmit power and interference would increase incrementally
as teams play their best replies sequentially. Thus the game would converge to the NE with the
lowest overall transmit power, which, as we argue below, would be preferred in terms of social
welfare. To do that, all teams initialize their transmit power to zero, and sequentially run the
Best-reply Power Setting (BPS) algorithm reported in Alg. 2.
We refer to the single execution of the BPS algorithm by any of the teams as an iteration.
Note that the order in which teams play does not affect the convergence or the outcome of the
game, since all teams start from the zero-power strategy. At each iteration, the leader of the
team that is playing determines the strategy (i.e., the power level to be used at each location
in the team) that represents the best reply to the strategies selected so far by the other teams.
The team leader will then notify it to the neighboring team leaders that can be affected by this
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choice. BPS will be run by the teams till convergence is reached, which, as shown in [21], occurs
very swiftly. Also, we remark that the strategies identified over the different iterations are not
actually implemented by the PoAs. Only the strategies representing the game outcome will be
implemented by the PoAs, which will set their downlink power accordingly for the current time
period.
In order to detail how the BPS algorithm (Alg. 2) works, let us consider the generic i+ 1-th
iteration and denote the team that is currently playing by t. The algorithm requires as input the
carrier c at disposal of the PoAs and the strategies selected so far by the other teams, s−tc (i).
Additionally, it requires the cost components weights ξ and δ, the SINR threshold γmin, used to
qualify unserved users, and the utility function parameters α and β. This latter set of parameters
are calculated offline and provided to the teams by the network operator. The algorithm loops
over all possible strategies in the strategy set of team t, Stc. For each possible strategy, s, and
each location l within the team, it evaluates the interference experienced by the tiles within
the location area (line 4). This value is used to calculate the SINR and the utility (lines 5-6),
then the first cost component is updated (line 7). In line 8, it is verified whether UEs in tile
z achieve the minimum SINR value. If not, the cost component et is amended to include the
affected UEs. The overall team utility for each potential strategy s is obtained by summing over
the individual tile utilities weighted by the fraction of UEs present in each tile. We recall that
such weight factor ensures that the UE distribution affects the outcome of the game accordingly.
Once the utility and cost are obtained, the team payoff corresponding to strategy s is calculated
(line 11). After this is done for all possible strategies, the leader chooses the strategy st(i+ 1)
that maximizes the team payoff. Note that, according to our game model, arg max? in line 12
denotes the following operation: it applies the arg max function and, if more than one strategy
is returned, the best strategy is selected by applying the list of preferences in Sec. IV-A.
Theorem 2: When the NE is not unique, then the BPS algorithm reaches the NE that maximizes
the social welfare, i.e., the sum of individual payoffs.
Proof: See Appendix B.
B. Multi-carrier scenario
We now extend the BPS algorithm to the multi-carrier case. As mentioned before, the team
leader has to decide on the power level to be used at each available carrier, at each location
within the team. Thus the team strategy is no longer a vector, but an L× C matrix, each entry
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Algorithm 2 BPS Algorithm run by team t at iteration i+ 1
Require: c, s−tc (i), ξ, δ, α, β, γmin
1: for all s ∈ Stc do
2: Set ut(s, s−tc (i)), w
t(s, s−tc (i)), pi
t(s, s−tc (i)), et to 0
3: for all l ∈ Lt and z ∈ Zl do
4: Compute I tz,c by using Eq. (1)
5: Compute γtz,c by using Eq. (2)
6: ut(s, s−tc (i))← ut(s, s−tc (i)) + EzEt(1+e−α(γtz,c−β))
7: pit(s, s−tc (i))← pit(s, s−tc (i)) + ξa¯l,csl,c
8: if γtz,c ≤ γmin then
9: et ← et + EzEt
10: pit(s, s−tc (i))← pit(s, s−tc (i)) + δet)
11: wt(s, s−tc (i))← ut(s, s−tc (i))− pit(s, s−tc (i))
12: stc(i+ 1)← arg max?swt(s, s−tc (i))
(l, c) indicating the power level to be used for carrier c at location l. A straightforward extension
of Alg. 2 would imply that lines 1–11 are executed for each element in the new extended strategy
set. However, the new strategy set, depending on the number of carriers, may become too large
and therefore make the algorithm impractical to use in realistic scenarios.
Analyzing the utility expression obtained in Eq. (3), we can note that since the carriers are in
different frequency bands and have separate power budgets (as foreseen in LTE-A), the utilities
secured at each carrier are independent of each other. In other words, the utility a team will
get at one of the carriers, is not affected by the strategy chosen at another carrier. The same
holds for the first cost component in Eq. (4). However, the overall payoff value is dependent
on the interaction between carriers due to the second cost component. Indeed, in networks with
CA support, a UE can be considered unserved only if the SINR it experiences is below the
threshold in all carriers. In order to obtain a practical and effective solution in the multi-carrier
scenario, we take advantage of the partial independence between the carriers, and run Alg. 2
independently for each carrier, keeping the size of the strategy set the same as in the single-
carrier scenario. Then, to account for the dependence exhibited by the second cost component,
we set the order in which the per-carrier games are played, using the order of preferences listed
in Sec. IV-A. Since the teams prefer to use high-frequency carriers over low-frequency ones,
due to their smaller interference impact, it is logical that the game is played starting from the
highest-frequency carrier. It follows that low-frequency carriers will likely be used to ensure
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coverage to UEs not served otherwise.
Importantly, our algorithm is still able to converge to an NE, since surely none of the teams
will deviate from the strategies they chose at each carrier. Also, since the game for the lowest
frequency carrier is played last, the number of served UEs cannot be further improved without
increasing the power level on the other carriers, which we already know is not a preferable move
as it has not been selected earlier. Thus, although it does not search throughout the entire solution
space as for the single-carrier scenario, the procedure is still able to converge to an NE that
provides a close-to-optimum tradeoff among throughput, user coverage and power consumption.
The results presented in [21], obtained for toy scenarios, confirm that our scheme provides
performance as good as that achieved by an exhaustive search in the strategy space.
C. Complexity and overhead
The complexity of the algorithm depends largely on the size of the strategy sets that are
available to the teams, St, since each team has to find the strategy which maximizes its payoff
value by searching throughout the entire set. The set size depends on the number of discrete
power levels available to the PoAs (|P |), the number of locations in the team (L) and the number
of CCs available at each location (C). In the single-carrier scenario, we have |St| = |P |L, while
in the multi-carrier scenario the size exponentially grows to |St| = |P |LC , which is reduced to
|St| = C|P |L by our approach.
In order to determine the downlink power setting, PoAs leverage the feedback they receive
from their associated users on the channel quality that they experience with respect to all PoAs
within reference signal range. These reports which are supported by current standards [22] occur
approximately every 5 s. Each location is expected to send these values, once per BPS update
period, to the team leader which will in turn run the BPS algorithm. We assume that PoAs within
the same macrocell are interconnected, or at least connected to the macro PoA, via, e.g., optical
fiber connections, which allows for swift communication between them. Thus, the overhead of
control information flowing between PoAs within a team and their team leader is very limited
and can be considered negligible. This is a reasonable assumption since it is expected that the
architecture foreseen for future networks will allow PoAs that are geographically close to share
a common baseband [1]. In addition team leaders, i.e., macro PoAs, also need to exchange
their respective BPS outcomes at each iteration. Recall that, at each iteration, BPS produces the
selected power level at each location and each carrier, which indicates that the team leaders need
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Fig. 2. The network scenario and the different types of urban areas.
Fig. 3. Snapshots of user distribution. The red dots represent pedestrian UEs, while the blue dots represent vehicle UEs. Left:
Morning; Middle: Afternoon; Right: Evening.
to exchange L× C integer values. In order to avoid additional overhead, team leaders can stop
the broadcast of their BPS outcome, as soon as it is unchanged from the previous iteration.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We consider the realistic two-tier network scenario that is used within 3GPP for evaluating
LTE networks [23]. The network is composed of 57 macrocells and 228 microcells. Macrocells
are controlled by 19 three-sector macro PoAs, while micro PoAs are deployed randomly over
the coverage area so that there are 4 non-overlapping microcells per macrocell. The inter-site
distance is set to 500 m. The overall network area is divided into 4,560 square tiles of equal
size. The tile size was set so that an average of 2.5 and a maximum of 10 users fall within
Fig. 4. BPS achieved power strategy for the morning scenario. Left: CC1; Middle: CC2; Right: CC3.
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TABLE I
UE DENSITIES AND CELL REQUEST ARRIVAL RATES
City centre Commercial area School Park Residential area
Baseline UE density [UE/msq] 0.0245 0.0147 0.0074 0.0009 0.0009
Percentage of vehicles 30% 5% 5% 5% 50%
Density weights
Morning (7-9 AM) 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8
Afternoon (3-5 PM) 1 0.95 0.95 0.7 1
Evening (10 PM-12 AM) 0.08 0.5 0.01 0.5 0.6
Cell request arrival rates λ
Morning (7-9 AM) 0.75 0.54 0.27 0.04 0.04
Afternoon (3-5 PM) 1.5 0.9 0.4 0.03 0.05
Evening (10 PM-12 AM) 0.12 0.45 0.005 0.02 0.03
any tile, while ensuring that users within a tile experience similar channel conditions. The PoAs
are grouped into 57 five-location teams, each consisting of 1 macro PoA and 4 micro PoAs
within its macrocell, unless stated otherwise. Specifically, to make the scenario more realistic
and comparable to an actual urban scenario, we divide the network coverage area into five types
of urban areas: city centre, residential area, commercial area, parks and school area, as shown in
Fig. 2. The UEs are also randomly dropped with varying density depending on the population
density of the area type as well as time of the day (morning, afternoon or evening). Reference
values for UE density were obtained using official population statistics of the city of Rome
(Italy) [24], and then scaled to represent realistic values for cellular users of a single network
provider. The UE densities were further scaled for the different urban areas and times of the
day, using weights extracted from the data provided in the MIT Senseable City Lab project [25].
Note that, in addition, user density around micro PoAs is four times higher than over the rest
of the macrocell. The mobility of pedestrian UEs was modeled using the random walk model,
while the mobility of vehicular UEs was modelled using real mobility traces collected from taxi
cabs in Rome [26], assuming an average velocity of 30 km/h. Snapshots of user distribution
at different times of the day are shown in Fig. 3. The data traffic is simulated by generating
download requests, whereby a random user requests to download a file which can be either
video (file size: 1 Mb) or a generic file (file size: 500 kb), with equal probability. The number of
requests per cell follows a Poisson distribution with a certain arrival rate λ per cell, which varies
depending on the urban area and time of the day. The final values obtained for user densities
and λ are shown in Table. I
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All UEs are assumed to be CA enabled. PoAs can use three CCs, each 10 MHz wide, with
the following central frequencies: 2.6 GHz (CC1), 1.8 GHz (CC2) and 800 MHz (CC3). We
apply the ITU Urban Macro (UMa) model to calculate channel coefficients between macro
PoAs and UEs, and the ITU Urban Micro (UMi) model for the channel between micro PoAs
and users [18]. In addition to path loss, we also consider shadowing effects, and, in the case of
vehicular users, fast fading caused by the mobility. SINR values are mapped on throughput using
the look-up table in [27]. The maximum transmit powers for macro and micro PoAs are set at
20 W and 1 W, respectively [18]. The game is played by all teams using the BPS algorithm
for the multiple-carrier scenario. The power consumed by the network nodes is calculated using
the power consumption model provided in [28]. The sigmoid function parameters are α = 1
and β = 1, which were selected as the most appropriate to model the relationship between the
selected strategy and final user rate. The SINR threshold is set at γmin = −10 dB, based on
[27]. The value of the cost parameter ξ, is calculated before running the BPS, using the dynamic
pricing algorithm in Sec. IV-B, with k = 0.25. The power setting update period is set at 100 ms,
which is considered sufficient from a practical perspective. Shorter update frequencies, as low
as 10 ms, can also be implemented, provided that the delay incurred by the communication
between macro PoAs is reasonable. However, while such short update time might make the
algorithm more responsive to channel dynamics, we consider that longer update periods, such
as 100 ms, perform excellently as confirmed by our results, while incurring significantly less
signaling overhead. Unless otherwise specified, the weight factor for the second cost component
is set at δ = 0.6. Note that the values for k and δ were chosen based on a numerical sensitivity
analysis provided in our previous study [21].
The performance of the two algorithms is compared to the fixed strategy in which all PoAs
transmit at highest power coupled with the eICIC technique, denoted as eICIC in the results.
This combination was shown to perform best in our previous work [21] and is widely used in
the literature and in practice. eICIC is applied with CRE for microcells set at 8 dB and macro
PoAs downlink transmissions muted in 25% of subframes (ABS). These values were chosen to
represent the mid-range of those applied in the surveyed literature [4]. The underlying resource
allocation is performed using the Proportional Fair (PF) algorithm.
First, we take a look at the power setting strategies that the BPS algorithm produces. In Fig. 4,
we depict the averaged strategies reached through the BPS algorithm during the simulation period
for the morning scenario. The strategies chosen by the teams for each CC are differentiated using
20
different shades, from white (zero power) to black (maximum power). Recall that the maximum
power varies depending on the type of PoA. Hexagons represent the macro PoAs, while circles
represent the micro PoAs. The figure shows that CC1, i.e., the high frequency carrier, allows
for higher transmit power levels to be used by both macro and micro PoAs, due to its low
interference impact. CC2 and, especially, CC3 are used to complement each other to ensure
overall coverage. In general we see that low transmit power levels are preferred for macro PoA
across all CCs, while for micro PoAs the chosen transmit power levels tend to be higher for
higher frequency CCs such as CC1. It can also be noted that in highly concentrated areas such
as the city centre and commercial areas, the micro PoAs tend to transmit at higher power levels,
while macro PoAs at lower power levels. Such a strategy enables micro PoAs in these areas,
which support most of the traffic demand, to transmit using a higher modulation coding scheme
(MCS), which in turn implies higher bit rate and, hence, throughput. In residential areas instead,
traffic demand is lower and more spatially spread; thus, it is the macro PoAs that serve most of
the traffic demand and therefore need to use higher power.
In the following plots we show how the dynamically obtained power strategies outperform
eICIC in some of the main performance metrics. Fig. 5 (left) shows that when BPS is employed
the amount of data downloaded over the network is always higher, especially during high intensity
periods like morning and afternoon. BPS also improves the service experienced by the UEs in
terms of demand met and percentage of failed downloads, as shown in Fig. 5 (middle) and
(right). Note that for each type of file we have set a specific deadline (0.5 seconds for videos
and 1 second for generic files), within which we expect the download to complete, otherwise it
is considered a failed download. In Fig. 5 (middle), we show that during intensive periods, BPS
improves the percentage of demand met across the entire network by around 10%, and reduces
the rate of failed downloads by approximately 15%. It is clear that, as the traffic load intensifies
in certain areas, which is the case in the afternoon scenario, both approaches have difficulties in
managing the demand, however BPS does ensure an improvement, especially for video content,
without applying any intelligent content-aware resource allocation techniques.
While the difference is smaller in the evening when the traffic load decreases significantly,
BPS still retains a considerable edge in energy efficiency (see Fig. 6). This is because BPS is
able to serve higher amounts of data, while consuming significantly less power. From Fig. 6
(left) it is clear that BPS improves the energy efficiency for both macro PoAs and micro PoAs,
however the effect is more significant for the latter: the gain in energy efficiency for macro
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PoAs varies between 15 and 20%, while for micro PoAs it can be as high as 100% during the
morning and it drops to around 60% in the evening. BPS tends to choose lower transmit powers
for macro PoAs, especially for dense areas with heavy traffic load, which significantly reduces
the interference experienced by micro PoAs who are responsible for serving the bulk of the
data. Indeed, if we look at the energy efficiency values for the different areas, shown in Fig. 6
(middle) and (right) for the morning scenario, it is clear that energy efficiency is highest in the
city centre, commercial and school areas where the traffic load is more intense in the morning.
Again, this is true for both macro and micro PoAs, but it is more significant for the latter.
In Fig. 7 we look at the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the achieved average user
throughput at the different times of the day, differentiated for vehicular (circle) and pedestrian
(cross) UEs. Note that, in general, BPS offers higher average user throughput for both types of
traffic, but the improvement compared to eICIC is more significant during peak hours. This is true
especially for pedestrian UEs, who are concentrated in the high density areas with heavy traffic
load. While it may look counterintuitive, vehicular UEs tend to have better average throughput.
The reason is that most of the vehicle UEs tend to be spread in the residential area where the
traffic demand is lower, and they tend to be situated in well covered areas. These two factors
influence the performance more than the fast-fading effects.
Fig. 8 shows the RB usage efficiency for macro (left) and micro PoAs (middle) calculated in
terms of kilobits transmitted per number of RBs used. Note that this metric takes into account only
those RBs allocated to UEs, not the overall number of RBs available. Again, BPS improves the
performance of the network for all types of PoAs, but more significantly for micro PoAs. eICIC
alone introduces important improvement in this metric, especially for macro PoAs, by offloading
some of their UEs to the micro PoAs; however, BPS provides an additional edge while lowering
the overall power consumption, as seen in the previous figures. For micro PoAs, BPS improves
this metric significantly by strategically varying the transmit power of the different macro PoAs
to reduce the overall interference. The performance of micro PoAs is further improved by the
fact that the power setting of the micro PoAs within the same cell is decided at the team level,
ensuring optimal coordination in terms of interference. It is worth noting that BPS could also
be applied jointly with eICIC, especially to take advantage of the CRE feature.
Fig. 8 (right) shows the level of fairness between inner and edge UEs in terms of average
user throughput, by calculating the Jain fairness index. While the level of fairness for inner and
edge UEs tends to be the same, there is a modest improvement for both categories when BPS is
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Fig. 5. Left: Total amount of downloaded content. Middle: Demand met. Right: Failed downloads per content type.
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Fig. 6. Energy efficiency in bits transmitted per joule consumed, at different times of the day (Left), and for different areas in
the morning scenario, for macro PoAs (Middle) and micro PoAs (Right).
applied. Note that, in multi-tier networks with high density of small cells, the line between inner
and edge UEs tends to blur, as edge UEs under the coverage of a micro PoA may experience
even better conditions than inner UEs; as a result, the average throughput may vary greatly
between UEs of the same category. BPS, however is able to improve the fairness by limiting the
overall interference. Fig. 9 (left) depicts the gains obtained by using BPS, compared to eICIC, in
terms of average user throughput in the different urban areas; again, significant gains are shown,
especially during morning and afternoon.
Finally, in Fig. 9 (middle), we look at the improvement obtained by applying BPS when
compared to eICIC alone, for different network configurations with a varying number of mi-
crocells within each cell. The improvement in the three core metrics: energy efficiency, average
user throughput and RB usage efficiency, tends to be significant and consistent as the number
of microcells is increased. In Fig. 9 (right), we also show the gains achieved in the same core
metrics, when we consider a higher maximum power for macro PoAs, i.e., 46 dBm (40 W),
which is foreseen for 5G systems [29], instead of 43 dBm (20 W), which we typically assume.
As expected, the effect of BPS is increased when the maximum power of the macro PoAs
is elevated, since the effects of interference, which BPS effectively mitigates, are even more
pronounced.
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Fig. 7. CDF of the average user throughput achieved by pedestrian and vehicular UEs. Left: Morning; Middle: Afternoon;
Right: Evening.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Given the devastating effects interference will have in future networks as they become more
dense and heterogeneous, effective means to contain and mitigate it will be key to enabling
the optimal use of resources. In this paper, we proposed a novel solution for downlink power
setting in dense networks with carrier aggregation, which aims to reduce interference and
power consumption, and to provide high quality of service to users. Our approach leverages
the different propagation conditions of the carriers and the different transmit powers that the
various types of PoAs in the network can use for each carrier. Applying game theory, we framed
the problem as a competitive game among teams of macro and micro PoAs, and identified it as
a game of strategic substitutes/complements with aggregation. We then introduced a distributed
algorithm that enables the teams to reach a desirable NE in very few iterations. Simulation
results, obtained in a realistic large-scale scenario, show that our solution greatly outperforms
the existing strategies in the main performance metrics, such as energy efficiency, user throughput
and spectral efficiency, while consuming little power. At last we remark that, while in this paper
we focused on downlink power setting, our approach could be applied to uplink power control
as well. In particular, in future ultra dense cellular networks, the set of users accessing a small
cell PoA could be modelled as a team whose leader is the PoA itself. Then the goal would be
to set the uplink transmit power so as to mitigate the interference that such users may cause at
the neighboring PoAs providing service to other sets of users.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Let us first consider the single-carrier case; the interference expression given in Eq. (1)
becomes I t(s−t) =
∑
t′∈T ∧t′ 6=t s
t′at′ . It is clear that this expression fits the aggregator definition
provided in Eq. (12), and, consequently, game G meets the conditions set out in Eqs. (9)-(10)
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and in either Eq. (11) or Eq. (13), as shown in [6]. The extension to a multi-carrier game with
multi-location teams, implies that the strategy chosen by the team is not a scalar value but a
matrix. Likewise, the interference experienced by each team (i.e., the aggregator) is a matrix.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that the number of locations is the same in each team,
and the set of the available carriers is the same for all teams. A decision has to be made for
each location and each carrier. As already defined, the strategy of a team t, st, is now an L×C
matrix, while the team interference caused to team t, aggregated from other teams’ strategies,
can now be modelled as a |Zt| × C matrix, each element of which is given by Eq. (1). The It
matrix can be therefore expressed as: It =
∑
t′ 6=t
∑
l′∈Lt′ a
t
l′σ
t′
l′ , where a
t
l′ is a |Zt| ×C matrix,
populated by the attenuation values al′,z,c, with each entry (z, c) indicating the attenuation factor
from location l′ in team t′ to tile z in team t, on carrier c. σ¯t′l′ is a diagonal C×C matrix, where
diag(σ¯t
′
l′ ) = [s
t′
l′,c1s
t′
l′,c2 · · · st
′
l′,cC ]. It is clear that the final interference matrix can be represented as
an aggregation of interference matrices caused by each individual team, therefore the aggregator
definition still fits. Condition 1) set out in Eq. (9), is fulfilled due to the very definition of our
payoff function, since the dependence on the other teams’ strategies is completely captured by
the aggregator.
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Regarding conditions 2) and 3), some further explanations have to be made to account for
the fact that strategies are no longer single power level (scalar), but instead sets of power levels
for the different locations and carriers within the team. Since both interference and strategy are
formulated as matrices in our scenario, we have to define what signifies an increase/decrease in
interference, and be able to distinguish between higher level strategies/lower level strategies. A
natural way to quantify the value of a matrix would be to use the Frobenius norm, in which
case, condition 3) becomes:
||θt(I ′t)||F ≤ ||θi(It)||F , ∀||I ′t||F > ||It||F ; ||θt(I ′t)||F ≤ ||θi(It)||F , ∀||I ′t||F < ||It||F
for games of strategic substitutes and games of strategic complements, respectively.
Note that the output of θt(I ′t) is a strategy, st, for team t which is, as we said, a matrix.
Similarly, we may use the Frobenius norm to differentiate between higher/lower strategies. To
fulfill condition 2), the best-reply function must be continuous, i.e., the output of θt given a
specific value of I ′t must be unique. In general, there may be cases in which a team may be
indifferent between several strategies, in terms of payoff. In such a scenario, we consider that the
team can apply the list of preferences (i)-(iii) in Sec. IV-A to fulfill this condition. Concerning
condition 3), we closely analyse the payoff function of the team given in Eq. (5). We note that
the team payoff is a sum of individual payoffs obtained at each tile for each carrier. The payoff
in each tile is directly linked to the interference value corresponding to that tile. Since we know
that at the individual tile condition 3) holds (it is identical to the single-carrier single-location
case), then it will hold also at the team level. Namely, when the level of interference experienced
by a specific tile increases, increasing thus the value of the Frobenius norm of the interference
matrix, then we know that the best reply of the individual location (which serves the specific tile)
will be lower/higher depending on whether the game is of strategic substitutes or complements.
Lowering/increasing the transmit power at one of the locations, indicates that the Frobenius norm
of the strategy matrix will also decrease/increase.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Without loss of generality and for ease of presentation, we consider the simplified scenario
we referred to before, with single-location teams and one tile per location. Indeed, recall that the
team’s payoff is given by its utility, represented by the sigmoid function in Eq. (3), discounted by
the cost in Eq. (4). From these expressions, it is easy to see that considering multiple per-team
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locations and tiles just translates into a larger number of additive terms within the summation,
hence the behavior of the expressions does not change.
Allowing for a continuous, rather than discrete strategy set, a team’s best reply response can
be derived by evaluating the first derivative of wt with respect to st and solving for zero, i.e.,
stbr(I
t) = arg maxwt(st, s−t)
= −I
t +N
αa
ln
 α
2ξt(I t +N)
− 1−
√(
1− α
2ξt(I t +N)
)2
− 1
− αβ
 (14)
By computing the derivative of Eq. (14) with respect to I t, we get:
∂stbr
∂I t
=
β
a
− 1
a
√
α[α−4ξt(I t +N)]−
1
αa
ln
(
x−
√
x2−1
)
(15)
where x = α
2ξt(It+N)
−1. Looking at this expression, we can see that for low interference values,
i.e., as I t → 0, the first two terms of Eq. (15) tend to 1
a
(
β − 1
α
)
(assuming N is very low). As
interference increases, the value of the first term is unchanged while the second term (which is
always positive) increases. With regard to the third term, provided that x ≥ 1, which is always
true if the condition identified in Eq. (8) is satisfied, the range of values taken by the logarithm
is (0, 1]. In particular, the value of the logarithm tends to −∞ when x → ∞ (i.e., I t is very
low), and it reaches 0 when x→ 1 (i.e., I t tends to its maximum as per Eq. (8)), indicating that
the third term is always non positive. Thus, when the interference is low, the value of Eq. (15)
is positive (note the negative sign in front of the third term). As interference increases, the
value of the derivative reaches 0 at one point and then it becomes negative for higher values of
interference (note the negative sign in front of the second term). In summary, when interference
is low, a team’s best response increases with interference, then it reaches a stagnation region
(where Eq. (15) takes either 0 or very small values), after which it starts to decrease slowly as
interference becomes too high. Also, note that the presence of a stagnation region is due to the
behaviour of the utility sigmoid function, which, as shown in Eq. (3), increases quickly initially
as it reaches its peak and saturates, varying little once the saturation point has been reached.
Let us now focus on the case of three teams, where the transmission of one of them has
the same effect in terms of interference on the other two, and vice versa. We remark that any
scenario where there is a dominant interferer can be viewed as a simpler, two-team game. Based
on the above findings, when the teams start from zero strategy as foreseen in BPS, the game
will evolve as follows. The first team to play will increase its power, in order to receive a payoff
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that is higher than zero. However, since the interference it receives from the other teams is
zero, the first team will be satisfied with choosing the leftmost power level that corresponds
to the maximum payoff (i.e., the saturation point of the utility sigmoid function). According
to the dynamic exhibited by Eq. (15), the first team’s increased transmit power will prompt an
increase in the best response of the team who plays next, and so on. Such behaviour of the teams
will repeat itself similarly in the successive iterations of the game, till the value of interference
experienced by the team currently playing falls in the stagnation region. This a turning point
in the game, as the current team will find beneficial not to increase its transmit power. From
this point on, the other teams will not change their strategies, as they will experience the same
interference as before, hence they will have no interest to change their transmit power level. This
implies that the game has converged to a NE (none of the teams has any incentives to move
from its chosen strategy), and, because each team started from zero, incrementally increasing its
strategy (hence the interference), the NE is at the lowest possible strategy level for each team.
We are now left to show that such an NE is the best in terms of social welfare, which is
defined as the sum of individual payoffs of the teams. To this end, let us substitute the expression
obtained for stbr (given in Eq. (14)) in the utility and payoff functions, so that we obtain the
expressions that describe the trends of the utility and payoff when applying the best response,
as the interference increases:
utbr(I
t) =
2ξt(I t +N)
α−√α2 − 4αξt(I t +N) ; wtbr(I t) = utbr(I t)− ξtstbr(I t) . (16)
From the expressions in (16), we note that, as the interference increases, utbr and w
t
br decrease
2,
even though the teams are playing their best responses. Let us assume, by contradiction, that
there is a second NE which provides a better social welfare. Because this NE was not reached
according to BPS, it must be a point that has not been explored by the algorithm, thus the
strategy in this second NE is higher than in the previous one at least for one of the teams. That
is, the overall transmitted power in this second NE must be higher, implying that the teams
are facing higher interference than in the previous NE. As shown by the above equations, the
utility and payoff values are always decreasing with interference, therefore the utility/payoff
values of teams facing higher interference must definitely be lower than those obtained in the
previous NE, implying that the social welfare must also be lower. At last we remark that the NE
reached through our BPS algorithm may not coincide with the global optimal point in terms of
2Indeed, the derivative of the utility function with respect to the interference is always negative.
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social welfare, but it is the optimum among the game’s pure NEs. Furthermore, the above proof
can be easily extended to any scenario including a generic number of teams, provided that the
interference level that each player causes on the others is given.
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